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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW  
A. BACKGROUND  
Survivability is typically defined along the following lines: the ability to continue 
to fulfill a mission even in the face of attacks and failures. The critical thing in this 
definition is that it is impossible to stop all attacks and prevent all failures. “No single 
component of a system is immune to failure or subversion.”[DIE01] 
Network Survivability is critical to Network Centric Warfare. It is also an 
important concern of homeland security because computers are part of the national 
critical infrastructures and must have high survivability while facing terrorist attacks and 
natural disasters.  
The growth of the Internet has produced the emergence of a global information 
society. Businesses can function internationally with great efficiency exchanging 
information seamlessly across their supply chains. Governmental use of the Internet will 
increasingly extend to international information sharing and collaboration. Perhaps the 
greatest threat to the Internet is the security of so many systems connected to it. A lack of 
security expertise by most of the Internet users results in vulnerabilities in the network 
that can be compromised by motivated attackers. 
There has been some studies on developing network survivability metrics, 
however the implementation of these survivability measures usually require money, big 
design changes to protocols and systems. As stated in [XIE02] Ellison provided a general 
definition of network survivability in [ELL99] and described some solution approaches to 
the problem. Another paper by the same authors defined a software engineering process 
for designing survivability into application [MEA00]. Furthermore, some concrete results 
are presented in some contemporary papers, e.g., [SUL99], [UMA01], [WEL00]. 
Nevertheless, their focus was still on how to make software agile to effectively detect and 
react to system component failures and software errors. In [WEL00], a customizable 
utility function is used to indirectly measure survivability of a system configuration from 
the point of view of the system user. Jha and Wing proposed a formal framework based 
on Bayesian networks for reasoning about the survivability properties of distributed 
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systems [JHA00]. The work was rigorous but the proposed algorithm was too complex 
for large networks. Unfortunately, the studies that have been done on network 
survivability so far are not mature enough and they lack quantifiable metrics. 
To address this lack of a network survivability measure, a global connectivity 
metric was developed in the thesis of another graduate student, Baris Aktop [AKT03]. 
This thesis contributed to the thesis work of Eng Hong Chua [CHU03], who developed a 
heuristic for comparing the connection reliability of two nodes to a common destination 
node when these two nodes have the same number of edge-disjoint paths to that 
destination. The heuristic is based on estimating the probability of each of the nodes 
being cut from the server given same number of link failures. This thesis includes some 
experimental results based on identifying all min-cuts of a network and computing 
survivability of the nodes based on these criteria.  
 
B. SCOPE 
In today’s competitive and dynamic information technology environment, there is 
a need for IT security as an integral component of the IT architecture of enterprises. The 
concept of “survivability metrics” and “security metrics” including test, evaluation, 
criteria identification, quantification of strengths, risk assessment/analysis and other 
related activities have been explored since 1995. However, these efforts have provided 
neither generally accepted nor reliable measures for rating information systems’ 
survivability and security. Moreover, inconsistent terminology has complicated the 
development of IT metrics, such as rating, ranking, quantifying or scoring measurements. 
There are three questions that should be asked when quantifying network 
survivability: 
1. WHAT you need to measure (e.g. technical, system) 
2. WHY you need to measure (e.g. comparison, description) 
3. WHOM you are measuring for (e.g. Technical experts, decision makers) 
This thesis is motivated by network security problems in which a decision maker 
has to select between nodes to host critical information services when there is an attack to 
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the network. The goal of this thesis is to give the network administrators criteria that 
would help them to make better decisions. These criteria can be used to develop 
heuristics and perform network reliability analyses to understand and better protect the 
networks. 
The main contribution of the thesis is a novel approach to handling correlated or 
dependent component failures. In a complex network, it is not trivial to compute the 
probability of failures of the nodes even if the component failures are independent. With 
this new approach, network administrators could predict the optimal nodes in a network 
under more realistic conditions.  Java-based simulation programs are developed to 
evaluate the approach. 
 
C. OVERVIEW 
This thesis is structured into the following chapters: 
Chapter II: Network Survivability Concept. Describe the concept of survivability. 
Discuss the importance of network survivability in Network Centric Warfare. 
Chapter III: Connectivity Based Survivability Metric. Define the basic terms of 
the graph theory; describe the connectivity based survivability metric. Describe the 
computation of the Ke metric and minimum number of cuts in a network. Introduce 
another algorithm to evaluate ranking of the nodes in a network.  
Chapter IV: A Heuristic Model for Determining the Survivability of the 
Connection. Describe a heuristic model, called Pe, and discuss the assumptions of the 
model. Validate and refine the heuristic model. 
Chapter V: A Realistic Approach for Network Survivability. Introduce an 
analytical model and algorithm to evaluate network survivability under more realistic 
conditions. 
Chapter VI: Conclusions and Future Work. Summarize the results from the thesis 





























II. NETWORK SURVIVABILITY CONCEPT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There has been a big improvement in network services as a consequence of 
developments in networking technology and the Internet. Government agencies and 
businesses are increasingly dependent on networked systems. The security of these 
systems remains a big problem because of the transparency of the public networks. 
Hardening of the information systems is never enough unless the systems are physically 
isolated. As long as the networks stay connected, there is going to be people who would 
like to attack them for various purposes.  
Survivability is the capability of a system to fulfill its mission on time while 
attacks, failures, or accidents are present [FIS99]. The term, mission, refers to high-level 
organizational objectives and mission fulfillment can be evaluated by the results achieved 
by the system in the context of operational conditions.  
While robustness, normally associated with fault tolerance in networks has long 
been an issue in providing service assurances in the presence of component failures, 
survivability is a new concept in non military networks. It ensures that a system can 
continue to deliver essential services even in the presence of attacks [CHU03]. Current 
network architectures, such as that of the Internet, rely on sophisticated, stand-alone 
routers. They are being overwhelmed with the introduction of the management functions 
while coming under more aggressive threats.  
In an integrated services network, quality of service (QoS) levels to individual 
user sessions must be guaranteed. To ensure QoS, the network has to reserve resources 
for a set of packets at particular routers. Additionally, an integrated services network 
must support real-time applications that have stringent packet delay requirements 
[XIE98].  
This thesis focuses on the failures and survivability of mission critical servers that 
deliver different network functions, such as resource management, routing, accounting, 
network management and security.  Such servers might include DHCP, DNS, or domain 
controllers, among others 
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In summary, a heavy weight node in a network can be a performance bottleneck. 
Therefore, responsiveness, scalability, and fault-tolerance are major concerns in a 
network design from the survivability point of view. 
 
B. CONCEPT OF SURVIVABILITY 
The survivability concept covers a broad range of engineering areas, such as 
security, fault-tolerance and reliability. Survivability research builds upon reliability 
research to focus on recovery after a failure in the system while reliability research 
assumes that failures can happen but that mission critical functions of the system must be 
active despite the failures [YUR99]. One of the best examples of survivability research is 
combat aircraft that can still fly even though they have experienced some extensive 
system damage.  
In the computer/ telecommunications infrastructure some part of a network is 
always down due to attacks or failures. Network managers test and collect data to 
understand why systems fail and to determine why some systems fail less or more than 
others. This kind of reliability analyses assumes that failure events are independent (for 
mathematical analysis). In this thesis, our goal is to compute the probability of failures of 
the nodes, including dependent/conditional node failures given the dependencies and 
probability of failure statistics.  
Although the security and survivability approaches are different, they cannot be 
separated. A security approach in a network tries to identify the holes, or vulnerabilities, 
of the systems and harden them. Survivability ensures that a network performs its 
functions in the midst of attacks or failures, while security ensures high system resistance 
to attacks. For example, safes are traditionally classified according to how long they can 
be expected to resist certain types of attacks, such as break-ins. In this example, 
survivability of the safe is a decision criterion from the security point of view. Therefore, 
when we analyze networks, we need quantifiable measures from both the security and 
survivability points of view. [DIE01].  
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The design and evaluation of a survivable system requires consideration of 
reliability and security, adaptability, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness. Nowadays, 
markets tend to focus on minimalist solutions: just-in-time etc. As a result, systems tend 
to be meta-stable and they eventually collapse. Robust solutions require more expensive 
details. It is clear that the design and evaluation of survivable systems is hard. Even the 
question of defining appropriate metrics is difficult. The author suggests that the more 
appropriate approach is to focus on more realistic examples. This thesis defines 
dependent node failures in a network and provides a method to compute them without 
relying on tight assumptions. 
 
C. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE AND HOMELAND SECURITY 
As computer technology has become increasingly integrated into modern military 
organizations, military planners have come to see it as both a target and a weapon. 
Countries are developing and implementing cyber strategies designed to impact an 
enemy’s command and control structure, logistics, transportation, and other critical 
functions. As a RAND corporation study pointed out in the mid-1990s, the entry costs for 
conducting cyber war are extremely modest [SHI01].  
In a limited cyber war, the information infrastructure is the medium, target and 
weapon of attack, with little or no real-world action associated with the attack. An insider 
might place malicious software directly within the enemy’s network. Degrading the level 
of service of the network may cause the enemy to use alternate routes, which may cause 
additional vulnerabilities. Denial-of-service attacks would require different approaches 
when there is no Internet access in the systems that are supporting critical, national 
infrastructures. A failure of emergency services in major cities would not only result in 
many people dying, but also would make people lose confidence in government, thereby 
generating both physical and psychological effects. 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is based upon the experiences of organizations 
that have successfully adapted to the changing nature of their competitive spaces in the 
Information Age. The centrality of the information and its potential as a source of power 
is the source of the power of NCW. NCW gives a new framework for analyzing military 
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missions, organizations, and operations. Figure 1 shows the Military as a Network-
Centric Enterprise [http://www.dodccrp.org/NCW/ncw_chapter.htm, September 2003] It 
shows the infrastructure that is expected to enable shared battle space awareness and 
knowledge. The NCW framework will increase the tempo of operations, responsiveness, 
and combat effectiveness. At the same time, it will lower risks and costs. 
 
Figure 1.   Military as a Network-Centric Enterprise 
NCW is built around the concept of sharing information and assets. This is 
enabled by networking battle space entities together. In NCW, capabilities for sensing, 
commanding, controlling, and engaging are robustly networked. The source of increased 
power in a network comes from the content, quality, and the timeliness of the information 
flowing in the network. The structural or logical model of the NCW is given in Figure 
2[CEB98]. There is a high-performance information grid that enables the operational 
architectures of sensor grids and engagements grids. Sensor grids generate high levels of 
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battle space awareness quickly and synchronize awareness with military operations. 
Engagement grids translate the awareness into increased combat power. The cooperative 
engagement capability (CEC) combines a high-performance sensor grid with a high-
performance engagement grid. (See Figure 3)  
 
Figure 2.   Architecture for NCW 
 
Figure 3.   Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) 
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Virtual collaboration in the information domain has many operational benefits. In 
the following three examples, these benefits are highlighted. 
Example 1: New Relationships Between Commanders—Battle Command via 
VTC  
Old Way: Corps and division commanders travel across the battlefield to be in the same 
place at the same time to plan ground operations.  
Network Centric Warfare: Commanders interact via VTC, which results in a significant 
reduction in planning time and elimination of travel time.  
Value: Decreased planning time provides commanders with the operational flexibility to 
enable their forces to rehearse, move-to-contact, re-supply, repair, or rest. The net result 
is increased combat power.  
Concept Status: Demonstrated by U.S. Army in operational exercises.  
Example 2: Quality of Life  
Old Way: Deployed forces communicate with families and loved ones via mail or 
telephone, at infrequent intervals.  
Network Centric Operations: Deployed forces communicate with families and loved ones 
with increased frequency and timeliness via e-mail (potentially on a daily basis), 
telephone, or VTC. 
Value: Deployed war fighters are able to solve family problems in close to real time (e.g., 
finance), interact with their children, and experience their children's lives while they are 
growing up. Worry goes down, morale goes up, and operational effectiveness remains at 
a higher level over long deployments.  Although, operational security must be closely 
monitored and enforced to ensure missions are not compromised. 





Example 3: Distance Learning  
Old Way: Units release war fighters to attend training or education events away from 
their duty locations.  
Network-Centric Operations: Education is provided to warfighters deployed with their 
units via VTC or compact disk (CD-ROM).  
Value: Manning levels are maintained and opportunities for education and training are 
available to all deployed forces. Operational proficiency and morale increase.  
Concept Status: Operational [http://www.dodccrp.org/NCW/ncw_chapter.htm, 
September 2003]. 
For Network Centric warfare to work, the right data must be available to the right 
people at the right time. For example, satellite imagery of a threat from a mobile Scud 
launcher is important information. It needs to be accessible by the key planners and 
attack pilots [LAW00]. 
There are many examples of cyber terrorists’ attacks recently. One of the stories 
about these attacks focused on the Massachusetts Water Resource Authority (MWRA), 
the agency that controls water for much of eastern Massachusetts [DES02].  A cyber 
intruder can easily exploit the computers that control the flow of water. However, even if 
a hacker penetrates its network, the MWRA has a multitude of checks that ensures 
contaminated water never reaches people. Preventing physical harm caused by a cyber 
attack is easier than protecting valuable data from cyber attacks. Experts agree that the 
most harmful cyber attack threat is the one that combines these two intended results. 
One expert, Mark Fabro, president and chief scientist at Terrosec Corporation, a 
security consulting firm in Toronto, says it might be possible to identify not only the 
principle components of the network that controls the national power grid, but also the 
physical location of these components. In that fashion, a cyber terrorist would either 
know which network components to attack or where the most exposed vulnerability 
exists for physical attacks. “That kind of information, combined together, could be used 
to devastate elements of the critical infrastructure,” Fabro says. 
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The National Infrastructure Protection Center, an organization charged with 
protecting critical U.S. infrastructure, in January 2003 issued a bulletin warning that a 
computer, owned by an individual with ties to Osama bin Laden, contained information 
about the structural engineering of dams and other water-retaining structures [DES02]. 
The bulletin said law enforcement agencies had "received indications" that other Al-
Qaeda members were interested in water supply and waste management practices and 
were culling information about insecticides and pest control practices from several Web 
sites. (See: http://www.nipc.gov/publications/infobulletins/2002/ib02-001.htm, 
September 2003) The government is making a concerted effort to ensure that its own 
Web sites don't offer any assistance to terrorists. On March 19, the Bush administration 
went so far as to order all government agencies to remove from public view any 
information on "weapons of mass destruction, as well as other information that could be 
misused to harm the security of our nation and the safety of our people."[DES02]. 
There are other examples of attacks against information systems. In south Florida, 
a hacker was able to break into local government systems and divert 911 calls to a local 
pizza parlor. In Houston, Texas, FBI officials caught a hacker before he could insert a 
worm into computers that would have resulted in the widespread shutdown of 911. And 
in 1997, a young hacker shut down communications at an FAA tower in Worcester, 
Massachusetts, for six hours. These attacks are not limited to the continental United 
States, as NATO servers were shut down for several days during the 2000 bombing 
campaign in Serbia and Kosovo. 
These examples underscore the necessity that network designs integrate notions of 
robustness and survivability in the hosting of critical missions. At the same time, 
contingency plans are required for the recovery of critical roles. Therefore, a solution for 
networks that will make them operate efficiently and safely is proposed 
13 
III. CONNECTIVITY BASED SURVIVABILITY METRIC 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis the author focused on a connectivity-based survivability metric 
developed in [AKT03] and evaluated the heuristic developed in [CHU03], which is used 
for comparing the connection reliability of two nodes to a common destination node 
when these two nodes have the same number of edge-disjoint paths to that destination. 
The heuristic is based on estimating the probability of each of the nodes being isolated, or 
cut, from the server given some number of link failures. This thesis provides some 
experimental results based on identifying all min-cuts of a network and computing 
survivability of the nodes based on these criteria.  
Two criteria were used to compare and rank the nodes of a network: 
1. Network survivability metric based on the edge-connectivity factor (Ke). 
2. Probability of failure of a link given Ke number of edge failures. 
These criteria are investigated for a given node collection in sequence.  That is, if 
two nodes have the same value for Ke, then the second criteria is examined. 
During the research, this heuristic was validated and refined. Given Ke number of 
failures, the nodes in a network can always be ranked, as mentioned in Section C of this 
chapter. The definitions and formulas used to calculate this connectivity-based 
survivability metric are provided below. 
 
B.  DEFINITIONS OF THE TERMS USED IN GRAPHS AND ALGORITHMS 
A network is modeled using a graph consisting of nodes representing 
communications centers and edges representing the links between communication 
centers. A graph G, which is denoted by (V, E) consists of a set of nodes or vertices, V, 
and a set of edges, E. Each element of E is an unordered pair (vi, vj), where vi and vj are 
elements of V.  
A graph is called undirected graph if it consists of undirected edges. A loop is a 
set of one or more sequential edges that originates and terminates at the same node. 
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A Path is a walk in which all edges and all vertices on the walk are unique, except 
that the first and last node may be the same. Edge-disjoint paths are paths with no edges 
in common. Node-disjoint paths are paths that share no common nodes other than the 
source and destination nodes. 
A cut-set is a set of edges whose removal disconnects the graph. A minimum cut-
set, or min-cut, is a cut-set that contains the fewest possible number of edges which when 
removed disconnects the graph. 
 
C. CONNECTIVITY BASED SURVIVABILITY METRIC 
To find the most optimal location (node) for the server in a network, the clients 
must be offered reliable connectivity to the server. The probability that a client will 
survive a number of edge failures is dependent on the order of the edge-disjoint paths 
between server and the client. The greater the number of edge-disjoint paths between the 
server and the client, the better and more reliable the connection is. In order for the path 
between a node and a server to be non operational, there must be at least as many edge 
failures as there are edge-disjoint paths (Ke) between the two.  
For example, if an assessment of the robustness of the connectivity between two 
nodes and a third node is going to be done, looking at the Ke can be a good start to the 
decision process. However, the Ke of the two nodes might be equal. In that case, finer 
granularity in computing the connectivity of the nodes is necessary. The second criteria, 
the probability of a node being disconnected given Ke number of edge failures, should 













When two nodes, for example s1 and s2, have the equal Ke values, the comparison 
is done by } failureedge |1}d),{cut(sP 1r eK==  and 
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} failureedge |1}d),{cut(sP 2r eK==  values. The location with the smaller probability 
has a higher survivability. 
 
D. COMPUTATION OF KE 
In a network, the maximum flow value, when unit weights are assigned to all the 
edges in the graph, is equal to the Ke value. There are different algorithms to compute the 
maximum flow in a network. An open-source, Java-based algorithm platform (JGAP) 
was downloaded from http://im.ncnu.edu.tw/~tsai/definite/JGAP/ JGAP.html, September 
2003. Finding Ke by Ford-Fulkerson’s maximum flow algorithm was implemented in 
Java by Baris Aktop [AKT03]. The pseudo code for this algorithm is given in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.   Pseudo code for finding the maximum flow 
 
The complexity of this maximum-flow algorithm is O (N |E|2), where N is the 
number of vertices and E is the total number of edges in the graph. The algorithm uses 
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augmenting paths to find a path of positive capacity from the source node to the 
destination node and adds it to the flow. This adding continues till no more augmenting 
paths are found in the graph. The output of the algorithm is the flow variable, which 
contains the summation of flow capacities of all augmenting paths. Breadth-First Search 
(BFS) is used in the maximum flow algorithm to find augmenting paths because it 
ensures the paths chosen are of minimum length.  
 
E. COMPUTATION OF MINIMUM CUTS (MIN-CUTS) 
As noted, if the Ke values of nodes under consideration are equal, looking at the 
conditional probability of connectivity failures for the nodes, given Ke, might be a second 
criterion to break the tie. To compute this probability, it is necessary to find out the 
number of min-cuts between the server and the client. 
There are critical edges that have no alternate paths between a source and the 
destination nodes. Removal of these critical edges will cause the path between source and 
destination to be disconnected. The more critical edges that exist in the path to a node 
being considered the lower the survivability of the connectedness of that node. The 
number of critical edges determines the number of min-cuts in a graph. The pseudo code 
for the algorithm to enumerate them is given in Figure 5. Currently, there is no known 
algorithm that is able to solve all types of graphs in polynomial time. The complexity of 




Figure 5.   Pseudo code for finding the min-cuts 
 
Figure 6 shows an example graph. The source is Node 0 and the destination is 
Node 5. Figure 7 shows the edge-disjoint paths in different colors. The Ke, which is the 
edge-connectivity of Node 0, is 2. Figure 8 shows in how many milliseconds the 
algorithm was able to identify the min-cuts. 
Enumerating all min-cuts in a graph is an NP-hard problem and is not likely to get 
solved in polynomial time, depending on the graph topology. The proposed algorithms 
were able to identify all min-cut sets in polynomial time for certain type of graphs.  
In Figure 9, there are 4 edge-disjoint paths between Node 0 and Node 5. The Ke 
value for the Node 0 is 2 and 16 min-cuts were enumerated by the algorithm in 300ms, as 
shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 6.   Example Topology-1 
 
 
Figure 7.   Edge-disjoint paths and Ke value of source node 0 
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Figure 8.   Number of mincuts found in 120ms. 
 
The number of min-cuts in Figure 8 is identified as follows: 
 
There are 4 Min-cut sets :  (0 , 6)  (0 , 7)  (5 , 6)  (5 , 7)  
Edge 0 is between Vertex 0 and Vertex 1 
Edge 5 is between Vertex 4 and Vertex 5 
Edge 6 is between Vertex 0 and Vertex 6 






Figure 9.   Example Topology-2 
 
Figure 10.   Showing 4 edge-disjoint paths between 0 and 5 
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Figure 11.   Number of Mincuts found in 300ms. 
 
 
The number of min-cuts in Figure 11 is identified, as follows: 
There are 16 Min-cut sets :  (0 , 1 , 2 , 3)  (0 , 1 , 2 , 7)  (0 , 1 , 3 , 6)  (0 , 1 , 6 , 
7)  (0 , 2 , 3 , 5)  (0 , 2 , 5 , 7)  (0 , 3 , 5 , 6)  (0 , 5 , 6 , 7)  (1 , 2 , 3 , 4)  (1 , 2 , 4 , 7)  (1 , 3 
, 4 , 6)  (1 , 4 , 6 , 7)  (2 , 3 , 4 , 5)  (2 , 4 , 5 , 7)  (3 , 4 , 5 , 6)  (4 , 5 , 6 , 7)  
Edge 0 is between Vertex 0 and Vertex 1 
Edge 1 is between Vertex 0 and Vertex 2 
Edge 2 is between Vertex 0 and Vertex 3 
Edge 3 is between Vertex 0 and Vertex 4 
Edge 4 is between Vertex 1 and Vertex 5 
Edge 5 is between Vertex 2 and Vertex 5 
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Edge 6 is between Vertex 3 and Vertex 5 
Edge 7 is between Vertex 4 and Vertex 5 
 
In graphs like that in Figure 11, when the numbers of nodes on the paths increase 
and the number of edge-disjoint paths increases, assuming no cross-paths between them, 
as shown in the topology in Figure 12, the total number of min-cuts is nKe , where (n-1) is 
the number of nodes that exist between the source and destination on an edge-disjoint 
path. This makes the time to enumerate all min-cuts grow exponentially with the number 
of Ke.  
 
F. ANOTHER ALGORITHM FOR ENUMERATING THE ALL MINIMUM 
WEIGHT AND NEAR-MINIMUM S-T CUTS 
Because of the complexity of the algorithm given in Figure 5, the Java program 
given in [AKT03] was not suitable for large network topologies. Therefore, a second Java 
implementation for enumerating all min-cuts in a given graph was used to run the 
simulations. The Java code is detailed in [WOO00].  
Briefly, this enumeration algorithm is based on a recursive “inclusion-exclusion” 
method. The algorithm identifies a min-cut by finding the maximum flow, using Ford-
Fulkerson’s maximum flow algorithm, in the network and then partitions the space of 
minimal cuts by attempting to include and exclude specific edges. In this algorithm, if the 
network edges have different integer weights assigned, by setting the variable e greater 
than zero, near-minimum weight s-t cuts can be found, too.  A cut is a “near-minimum” if 
its weight is less than the product of (1+e) and the minimum cut weight, for some e = 0. 
The complexity of the algorithm for finding only minimum cuts (when e = 0) is O 
(f (|V|, |E|) + |V||E||C0 (G)|) where f (|V|, |E|) is the complexity of solving a maximum flow 
problem on G = (V, E) and C0 (G) is the set of minimum cuts in graph G. The worst-case 
complexity of the algorithm for near-minimum cut enumeration remains unknown when e 
> 0. 
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In this project, the topologies shown in Figures 6 and 9 were given as inputs to the 
Java program and simulation results were obtained in 80ms and 50ms respectively. It was 
observed that enumerating all min-cuts by this algorithm was more efficient than the one 
described in Section 5. Since all the graphs used as examples in this paper had edge-
weights of one, near-minimum cut enumeration was not tested.  More results can be 
found in [WOO00]. 
Neither of the Java implementations used to simulate the various types of graphs 
were able to complete running with 1 node, which is 2 links, on an edge-disjoint path 
between the source and destination where 40 edge-disjoint paths were discovered. This 
makes the number of min-cuts to evaluate 240, which is more the a trillion min-cuts. 
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IV. A HEURISTIC MODEL FOR DETERMINING THE 
SURVIVABILITY OF THE CONNECTION  
A. PE MODEL 
The probability estimator model, Pe, determines the survivability of the connection 
based on the number of critical edges in each edge-disjoint path between the two nodes. 
An edge is critical if its failure will disconnect the path. So, the less critical edges, the 
lower the probability of path disconnection.  
In the Pe model, the goal is to approximate } failuresedge |1d){cut(s,Pr eK= , the 
probability of connection failure given Ke number of edge failures. The connection 
between the two nodes fails if and only if the edge failures disconnect all the edge-
disjoint paths. In other words, each of the edge failures must be a critical edge of a 
different edge-disjoint path for the connection to fail [CHU03].   
The algorithm used to compute Pe is shown in Figure 13. The Pe   model has as its 
core the essential idea of finding the number of critical edges,
iP
C , in Path i. In the 
algorithm for evaluating each augmenting path, Line 3 initializes the number of critical 
edges,
iP
C , to the length of the path, i. At line 4, each edge and consecutive sequence of 
edges are checked for an alternative path.  If an alternate path is found then the sequence 
of edges between the ends of the alternate paths, vertices u and v, are not critical, 
therefore, 
iP
C  is decreased by the value equal to the distance between Vertex u and 


















Figure 13.   Pseudo code for Pe computation 
 
This computation is exact for graphs where alternative paths for edge-disjoint 
paths do not exist. However, in networks that are at least partially meshed, this will rarely 
be the case and this is why Pe is an approximation for the probability Pr . 
The Pe model as a heuristic was tested for graphs that have less than 12 nodes and 
results were verified in [CHU03]. The Pe model appeared to be more accurate than other 
heuristics developed before it, having an accuracy of almost 92% in determining the best 
node in a network to host a critical server.  
 
B. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE PE MODEL 
The heuristic model, Pe, introduced above, works under two assumptions: 
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1. The failures have uniform distribution. 
2. Nodes have independent failures. 
This means that the computation of the Pe is exact if you have independent and 
uniformly distributed failures, which is rarely the case.  The validity of these assumptions 
is considered below. 
 
1. Validation of the Underlying Assumptions 
In Chapter III, two criteria were given to compare and rank the nodes of a 
network.  These were: 
1. Network survivability metric based on the edge-connectivity factor (Ke). 
2. Probability of failure of a link given Ke number of edge failures. 
Given Ke number of failures, one can always rank the nodes in a network as 
discussed in Chapter III Section C. However, it was shown that 
} failuresedge |1d),{cut(sP 1r eK=  may not predict 
} failuresedge 1) ( |1d),{cut(sP 1r += eK  . The example used is shown in Figure 14. In this 
example, it was determined that ranking among nodes does not stay the same if the 
number of failures exceeds Ke. 
 
Figure 14.   The graph used to verify Pe model 
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In Figure 15, s1 (source node),  selected as Node 6, is to be compared to s2, which 
is Node 7. (See Figure 17 for s2) The two selected nodes have the same number of Ke, 
equal to two. Therefore, the second criteria must be evaluated, requiring that the 
minimum number of cut sets, min-cuts, given Ke failures, be computed. Execution of the 
simulation program determined that s1 has 5 min-cuts and s2 has 5 min-cuts. Therefore, 
according to Pe model, one would think that the two nodes would be ranked the same. 
However, if the number of failures exceeds Ke, three in this example, the simulation 
program determined that s1 has 58 cut sets and s2 has 62 cut sets, which means the ranking 
of the nodes should not be the same.  
 
Figure 15.   s1 = 6 (source), t =0 (Destination) 
 
Figure 16.   Shows the min-cut computation for s1  
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Figure 17.   s2 =7 (source) and t=0 (destination) 
 
As a result, a connectivity-based survivability metric, developed in [AKT03] was 
used and the heuristic developed in [CHU03] was evaluated. This heuristic is used to 
compare the connection reliability of two nodes to a common destination node when 
these two nodes have the same number of edge-disjoint paths to that destination. It is 
based on estimating the probability of each of the nodes being cut from the server given 
same number of link failures. The topology in Figure 14 was used to validate and refine 
this heuristic.  
The simulation results show that the statement, 
If } failuresedge |1d),{cut(sP 1r eK=  <   } failuresedge |1d),{cut(sP 2r eK=     
then    } failuresedge |1d),{cut(sP 1r n=   <  } failuresedge |1d),{cut(sP 2r n=    
where n > Ke, may not be always true.  This result implies that, while using the Pe model, 




































V. A REALISTIC APPROACH FOR NETWORK 
SURVIVABILITY 
A. LIMITATIONS OF THE EXISTING FAILURE MODELS 
The survivability computations presented in the previous chapters, from a 
mathematical point of view, assume that: 
1. All failures are equally likely. 
2. The failures are mutually independent. 
These assumptions do not adequately reflect the nature of real world network 
environments. Typically, different nodes or links can have different failure probabilities. 
More important, real systems show correlated failures. Correlated faults can result in 
reduced system reliability and availability [http://oceastore.cs.berkeley.edu, September 
2003].  
Server failures may be correlated because they share network routers, software 
bugs, configuration problems, operating systems, etc. Failure independence of the nodes 
in a network may be searched and a set of independent nodes may be modeled. Then 
selective use of resources from among these independent sets can be implemented to 
fight against correlation of failures.  This can be achieved by grouping highly correlated 
nodes together and consider each group a single domain. The means to model and 
compute the probability of failure of individual correlated domains remains unsolved 
because of complex conditional probability computations involved.  Therefore, our focus 
is relaxing Assumption 2 above by computing all failure probabilities within the network 
while including correlated failures.  This is likely a more realistic metric for network 
administrators. The next section explains the algorithm used to compute the probability 
of failures for correlated components. 
  
B. COMPUTING CORRELATED COMPONENT FAILURES 
In a graph, one first needs to know the entire node-disjoint cut-sets that disconnect 
paths between s and d. Given the probability of failures, one must then compute the 
probability of s-d being cut by attacking the problem in a brute-force manner, since there 
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is not a way of modeling dependent node failures as independent failures.  If all the 
failures can be viewed as independent failures, then computing 
} failureedge |1}d){cut(s,Pr eK== would be trivial by simply multiplying the 
probability values given.  
The heart of the algorithm is to compute the probability of all the node cut-sets. 
Without loss of generality, let us assume there are a total of four cut-sets. Consider the 
recursion given in Equation (3) below: 
 
P (A È B ÈC ÈD) = P (A) + P (B ÈC ÈD) – P (A n  (B ÈC ÈD))       (3) 
 
where A, B, C, and D represent the node cut sets. 
The equation above is a result of the well-established Equation: 
 
P (A ÈB) = P (A) + P (B) – P (An B)                    (4) 
 
Equation (3) can be solved recursively by the following equation: 
 
P (A ÈB ÈC ÈD) = P (A) + P (B ÈC ÈD) – P ((AB) È (AC) È (AD))       (5)  
 
where AB, AC or AD may include correlated component failures. 
A basic Java implementation of this approach can be found in the Appendix. In 
the implementation node cut-sets that disconnect the source node and destination node 
are stored in an array of vectors, depicted as “N [ ]” in Figure 18. Independent node 
failures, dependent node failures, and their corresponding values are stored in a hash 
table. The recursive computation given in Equation (5) is implemented in the procedure 




double findProbability((Vector N[ ]) 
{ 
 //base case 
 if (N.length = = 1) 
   
          double p1=1.0 
          if (failures of some nodes of N[0] are correlated) 
                double prob         get the joint failure probability of corresponding 
nodes from the probability table 
 
      N4[ ]   N[0] – {correlated nodes} 
      return  p1 * prob * findProbability(N4) 
 
 
  else     //In this case : failures of all nodes are independent 
   //then simply get the node probabilities and multiply them  
                                     all 
                                        for (each node in N[0]) 
   prob        get failure probability of the node from the 
                                                      probability table 
 
   p1       p1* prob 
       return p1 
   
 else     // now N.length > 1 
  //initialize vectors for recursive computation 
 
  Vector N1[ ] 
  Vector N2[ ] 
  Vector N3[ ] 
 
  N1 = N[0] //only the first vector 
  N2 = { N[1], N[2], ……, N[n] } //removal of the first vector 
  N3 = { N[0].N[1], N[0].N[2],…., N[0].N[n] } //cross product of N1 and 
N2 
 
                         Return 
                                          findProbability(N1) + findProbability(N2) + findProbability(N3) 




A basic topology example used to run and verify the results of the program is 
given in Figure 19. 
 
 








                               4                   5 
 
 
Figure 19.   Example topology to verify java implementation of algorithm 
 
In this example, Node 1 is the source node and Node 6 is the destination node. 
Nodes 2 and 3 are dependent nodes, as are Nodes 4 and 5. This means if Node 2 fails it 
increases the probability of the failure of Node 3. Node cut sets of this example are: { 
[2,5], [2,4], [3,4], [3,5] }.  
 
The following probability values given: 
P(2|3) = 0.3 (this is the conditional probability value because 2 and 3 are 
dependent nodes) 
P(4|5)  =  0.5 
P(2) = 0.4 
P(3) = 0.3 
P(4) = 0.4 
P(5) = 0.4 
 
The result for this graph P(1 and 6 being cut) = 0.12 is calculated by hand 




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A.  SYNOPSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
When there is an attack to a DON/DOD network, critical data servers should be 
relocated based on the current situation. The solution developed by this thesis gives the 
decision makers criteria that will help them relocate the servers to parts of the network 
where the services are more survivable.  This thesis explored this solution in the 
following manner. 
First, to compare and rank the nodes of a network, two criteria were used: 
1. Network survivability metric based on the edge-connectivity factor (Ke). 
2. Probability of failure of a link given Ke number of edge failures. 
Second, an algorithm to enumerate all min-cuts and near min-cuts was introduced. 
The implementations of these approaches were evaluated and tested using various graphs. 
However, because of the complexity issues involved in maximum flow, min-cut 
algorithms, these algorithms were practical only for certain types of networks.  
Third, a heuristic model, Pe, based on edge-connectivity, (Ke), was explained. The 
Pe model had previously been tested for graphs that have less than 12 nodes and the 
results were verified in [CHU03]. During this research it was shown that the assumption, 
If } failuresedge |1d),{cut(sP 1r eK=  <   } failuresedge |1d),{cut(sP 2r eK=     
then    } failuresedge |1d),{cut(sP 1r n=   <  } failuresedge |1d),{cut(sP 2r n=    
(For n =1, 2, 3….where n> Ke ), may not always hold. 
Finally, the limitations of the current survivability metrics were discussed. The 
author proposed a way to relax assumptions of the failure models. Two Java-based 
programs were used to simulate the effects of node failures. The simulation results are the 
computation of the connectivity factor of the nodes and the number of minimum cut-sets 
of the sample network. The implementation platform for the survivability metrics was a 
prototype, called the Server and Agent-based Active Network Management (SAAM) 
system, which was proposed by Prof. Geoffrey Xie in 1998 and developed by graduate 
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students of NPS over the ensuing years. A Java simulation was written by the author to 
verify the viability of the approach taken and to compute 
} failuresedge |1d){cut(s,Pr eK= . The time frame of this research did not allow for 
pertinent statistics to be gathered. 
 
B. FUTURE WORK 
Given current engineering practices, developing models that are reasonably 
independent of the details of failure nodes, probabilities and correlations is difficult at 
best.  However, modeling dependent node failures in a way such that they can be 
represented as independent node failures will ease the complexity of the computation of   
} failuresedge |1d){cut(s,Pr eK= .  Methods for implementing such models should be 
investigated 
Metrics, other than Ke, need to be established to quantify the fault tolerance, 
safety, reliability, and performance of the nodes in a network. 
Finally, more work needs to be done to verify and implement the proposed 













 * Title: Computer (s,t) failure probability  
 * Description: Brute-force computation and working with correlated node 
failures. 
 *  1. Link failures have been converted into node failures by transforming the 
graph. 
 *  2. Correlated node failures modeled as joint failure probabilities. 
 *  
 * Copyright:    Copyright (c) 2003 
 * Company: 
 * @author Ozlem Ozkok & Geoffrey Xie 
 * @version 1.0 
 */ 
 
public class ComputeProbability { 
 
 
  private final int NUM_CUT_SETS = 4; 
  private Vector nodeCutSets[] = new Vector[NUM_CUT_SETS];  
  private double p; 
  private Hashtable probTable;  
 
 
  public ComputeProbability()  
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  { 
    for (int i = 0; i < NUM_CUT_SETS; i++)  
    { 
      nodeCutSets[i] = new Vector(); 
    } 
 
    //Known node cutsets 
    //Note: The cutset are not mutually exclusive. 
    nodeCutSets[0].add(new Integer(2)); 
    nodeCutSets[0].add(new Integer(5)); 
 
    nodeCutSets[1].add(new Integer(2)); 
    nodeCutSets[1].add(new Integer(4)); 
 
    nodeCutSets[2].add(new Integer(3)); 
    nodeCutSets[2].add(new Integer(4)); 
 
    nodeCutSets[3].add(new Integer(3)); 
    nodeCutSets[3].add(new Integer(5)); 
     
     
    //Known failure probabilities 
    //Note: Failures of node 2 and 3 are correlated and so are node 4 and 5. 
    probTable = new Hashtable(); 
     
    probTable.put("2.3", new Double(0.3)); 
    probTable.put("4.5", new Double(0.5)); 
    probTable.put("2", new Double(0.4)); 
    probTable.put("3", new Double(0.3)); 
    probTable.put("4", new Double(0.4)); 




    System.out.println(probTable); 
 
    p = findProbability(nodeCutSets); 
 




  private double findProbability(Vector N[]) 
  { 
    if (N.length == 1)  
    { 
      System.out.println("Inside the base case " + N.toString()); 
      double p1 = 1.0; 
       
      int numNodes = N[0].size(); 
       
      for (int nodeCount = numNodes; nodeCount > 1; nodeCount--) 
      {         
        //Now search the probTable; starting with longest key 
        for (Enumeration e = probTable.keys(); e.hasMoreElements();) 
        { 
          String key = (String) e.nextElement(); 
          if (key.length() == nodeCount * 2 - 1)  //account for "." 
          { 
            //Convert key e.g., "1.2.3" into vector {Integer(1),Integer(2),Integer(3)}  
            Vector keyVector = convertToVector(key);   
             
            //check for match 
            boolean matching = false; 
            System.out.print("Key Vector = " + keyVector + "; N[0] = " + N[0] + 
"\n");             
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            for (int j = 0; j < keyVector.size(); j++) 
            { 
              matching = false; 
              for (int k = 0; k < N[0].size(); k++) 
              { 
                if ((keyVector.get(j)).equals(N[0].get(k))) 
                {  
                  matching = true; 
                  break; 
                } 
              } 
              if (!matching) 
                break;   
            } 
             
            if (matching) 
            { 
              if (!probTable.containsKey(key)) 
              { 
                System.out.println("Error: Required probability variable not given for 
node sequence " + key); 
              } 
              else 
              { 
                Double prob = (Double) probTable.get(key); 
                 
                //Remove corresponding nodes from N[0] since their joint probability is 
found. 
                //Note: their joint failure is independent of failures of the other N[0] 
nodes 
                   
                Vector N4[] = new Vector[1]; 
                N4 = formN4(N, keyVector); 
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                return (p1 * prob.doubleValue() * findProbability(N4)); 
              }   
                        
            } 
            else 
            { 
               System.out.println("No match for key: " + key + "\n"); 
            }                        
              
          }//end of if (key.length == ...  
           
        } 
      } 
       
      //Now nodeCount is 1 and in this case, failures of all nodes are independent. 
      //So just multiply their failure probabilities together 
      System.out.println("Now failures of all nodes in N[0] are independent.\n");      
       
      for (int i = 0; i < N[0].size(); i++) 
      { 
        String key = "" + N[0].get(i); 
                       
        if (!probTable.containsKey(key)) 
        { 
          System.out.println("Error: Required probability variable not given for node 
" + N[0].get(i)); 
          System.exit (1); 
        } 
        else 
        { 
          Double prob = (Double) probTable.get(key); 
          p1 = p1 * prob.doubleValue(); 
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        } 
      } 
       
      return p1;      
       
    } 
    else 
    { 
      Vector N1[] = new Vector[1]; 
      Vector N2[] = new Vector[N.length - 1];      
      Vector N3[] = new Vector[N.length - 1]; 
         
      N1 = formN1(N); // subset with only the first vector 
      N2 = formN2(N); // after removal of first vector 
      N3 = formN3(N); // cross product of N1 and N2 
       
      return findProbability(N1) + findProbability(N2) - findProbability(N3); 
 
    } 




  private Vector[] formN1(Vector temp[]) 
  { 
    Vector N1[] = new Vector[1]; 
    N1[0] = temp[0]; 
    return N1; 
  } 
 
  private Vector[] formN2(Vector temp[]) 
  { 
    Vector N2[] = new Vector[temp.length-1]; 
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    for (int c = 1; c < temp.length; c++) 
    { 
      N2[c-1] = temp[c]; 
    } 
 
    return N2; 
  } 
 
 
  private Vector[] formN3(Vector temp[]) 
  { 
    Vector N3[] = new Vector[temp.length-1]; 
     
    for (int c = 0 ; c < temp.length - 1; c++)  
    { 
      N3[c] = new Vector(); 
    } 
 
    for (int i = 1; i < temp.length; i++) 
    { 
      //Merge elements of temp[0] and temp[i] and put them into N3[i-1] 
      for (int j = 0 ; j < temp[0].size(); j++)  
      { 
        N3[i-1].add(temp[0].get(j)); 
      } 
 
      for (int k = 0; k < temp[i].size(); k++) 
      { //no duplicate is added 
        if (!N3[i-1].contains(temp[i].get(k)))  
        { 
          N3[i-1].add(temp[i].get(k)); 
        } 
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      } 
 
    } 
 
    return N3; 
  } 
 
 
  private Vector [] formN4(Vector temp[], Vector removeVector) 
  { 
    Vector N4[] = new Vector[1]; 
    N4[0] = new Vector(); 
 
    for (int count = 0 ; count < temp[0].size(); count++)  
    { 
 
      Integer temporary = (Integer) temp[0].get(count); 
      System.out.println("N4[0] = " + N4[0] + "; temporary = " + temporary); 
 
      if (!removeVector.contains(temporary))  
      { 
        N4[0].add(temporary); 
      } 
    } 
    return N4; 
  } 
   
   
  private Vector convertToVector(String key) 
  { 
    Vector v = new Vector(); 
     
    StringTokenizer token = new StringTokenizer(key,"."); 
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    while (token.hasMoreTokens())  
    { 
      Integer id = Integer.decode(token.nextToken()); 
      v.add(id); 
    } 
 
    System.out.println("Key = " + key + " ; new vector = " + v.toString()); 
    return v; 
  } 
   
   
  public String toString()  
  { 
    return "(s, t) Cut Probability = " + p; 
  } 
   
  public static void main( String args[] ) 
  { 
    ComputeProbability test = new ComputeProbability(); 
    System.out.println(test.toString()); 
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